That depends on the meaning of the word “moderate”

March 02, 2016

* Tom Gross: If there is one country that the New York Times, BBC and others misreport about as much as they do about Israel, it is Iran.

 

WHAT IF THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT WAS IN CHARGE OF U.S. ELECTIONS?

Political satire by Ebrahim Nabavi:

Here’s what Iran’s Islamic Guardian Council, the clerical body charged with vetting all candidates in Iran, would do if it was in charge of the American elections:

Declare Bernie Sanders a heretic and roundup and arrest his followers… Disqualify Hillary Clinton because of her husband’s illegitimate relations… Shut down The New York Times and ban political ads from appearing on any TV channel… Block access to Facebook, Twitter and Instagram until after the elections and send Mark Zuckerberg to prison for acting against national security… Disqualify all candidates from the Democratic Party… Send Jeb Bush to prison for becoming a candidate… Approve the nominations of Mark Rubio and Ted Cruz. Then order the police to prevent any gatherings in support of Cruz and ban all his campaign posters. Then declare Rubio the winner with 63 percent of the vote…

 

AMONG THESE “MODERATES,” MOSTAFA KAVAKEBIAN, WHO SAID “ISRAELIS AREN’T HUMANS”

* Editorial, Wall Street Journal: One of the Obama Administration’s hopes for its nuclear deal with Iran was that it would empower regime moderates. So it’s no surprise that the deal’s [Western] cheerleaders are proclaiming the Iranian election results as a triumph for the Islamic Republic’s “moderate” and “reformist” factions.

* At stake were seats in the Majlis, or Parliament, and the Assembly of Experts, the body that will select Iran’s next Supreme Leader. The vote was a carefully stage-managed process. The unelected Guardian Council disqualified 6,000 of the original candidates to the Majlis. Of the 801 candidates to the Assembly of Experts, only a quarter, or 161, made it to the ballot. Most of the disqualified candidates belonged to the reformist and moderate factions of the regime.

* Yet Western media are nonetheless describing the results as the moderates’ “best nationwide electoral showing in more than a decade,” as the Associated Press put it.

* Among these “moderates”: Mostafa Kavakebian, the General Secretary of Iran’s Democratic Party, who said in a speech: “The people who currently reside in Israel aren’t humans.” [Hitler also said Jews weren’t humans.]

* Another “moderate” is Kazem Jalali, who was the spokesman for the National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee and demanded the death penalty for Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, the two leaders of the pro-democracy Green Movement that was bloodily suppressed after the rigged 2009 elections.

* And Mohammad Reyshahry, who spearheaded the 1988 summary execution of thousands of leftists.

 

“HE HAS PLENTY IN THE WEST EAGER TO DO IT FOR HIM”

Eli Lake, Bloomberg views:

The headlines however tell a different story. The Guardian, for example, says: “Iranian elections deal blow to hardliners as reformists make gains.” The BBC concludes: “Reformists win all 30 Tehran seats.” And on it goes…

This is the magic of Iran’s elections. In the end, Iran’s supreme leader doesn’t need to defend their legitimacy. He has plenty in the West eager to do it for him.

 

Tom Gross: Among other headlines I have read:

The Los Angeles Times: “Reformers and moderates romp [to victory] in Tehran”

The Associated Press: “Iranian Moderates Win Majority in Parliament, Clerical Body”

The Times Of Israel: “Iran executes the entire male population of a village for drug trafficking, a senior Iranian cabinet minister said.”

 

HIS ELDEST SON COMMITTED SUICIDE, SAYING I WANT NO PART IN YOUR REGIME

Ruthie Blum, Israel Hayom:

For the past three years, the West has been tricking itself into seeing the Islamic Republic of Iran as a country undergoing a gradual process of reform. The outcome of Friday’s two elections – one for the Majlis (parliament) and the other for the Assembly of Experts – is serving as the latest mirage in the delusion.

Rouhani’s appearance on the international stage provided particular fantasy-fodder for supporters of a diplomatic solution to the problem of Iran’s race to obtain nuclear weapons and to guarantee its regional, and eventually global, hegemony… the only thing the nuclear deal accomplished was to enable Iran to step up its nuclear program, but with lots more money at its disposal; and Rouhani is no moderate…

Celebrations less than three weeks ago marking the anniversary of the 1979 revolution that turned Iran into an Islamic state included chants of “death to America,” “death to Israel” and a reenactment of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy’s humiliation of U.S. sailors who had strayed into Tehran’s territorial waters.

Rouhani was a long-time Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini loyalist, who has always backed and spearheaded the quelling of any popular protests, employing any bloody means to nip them in the bud…

In 1992, his eldest son committed suicide, leaving a note to this very effect, saying, “I hate your government, your lies, your corruption, your religion, your double-dealing and your hypocrisy. I am ashamed to live in an environment in which I am forced to lie to my friends every day and tell them that my father is not part of all this.”

 

THE AYATOLLAH KHAMENEI WILL MAKE SURE THE REGIME KEEPS CONTROL

Saeid Golkar (The National Interest):

Some in the West even hope that the nuclear deal will lead to the gradual implementation of democracy in Iran. But this analysis is premature. Ruling hardliners continue to resist reforms…

Iran tested mid-range ballistic missiles – in violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions – despite having just signed a treaty aimed at preventing nuclear proliferation. Then, the detention of American sailors, which seemed to be resolved amicably, was later revealed to be an antagonistic exercise after the regime broadcasted footage showing the sailors held at gunpoint and humiliated while in custody. Ayatollah Khamenei later praised the decision of the naval commander to detain the American sailors, awarding him the most prestigious military medal in Iran…

While Ayatollah Khamenei has allowed some semblance of political normalization to occur, he does not actually want the kind of pervasive normalization that will empower Iranians and lead to democracy. Rather, he wants Iran to be accepted in international diplomacy when it can benefit his country’s international image and geopolitical significance – but not when it would compromise the stability of his establishment regime. In other words, the Ayatollah desires selective normalization.

 

I attach five articles below, with extracts above for those who don’t have time to read them in full. (The writers of the second, third and fourth pieces are subscribers to this email list.)

* Please “like” these dispatches on Facebook here www.facebook.com/TomGrossMedia, where you can also find other items that are not in these dispatches.

-- Tom Gross


CONTENTS

1. “What if the Iranian government was in charge of U.S. elections?” (Political satire by Ebrahim Nabavi)
2. “Iranians can vote for whoever the Ayatollahs say they can vote for” (Editorial, Wall Street Journal, Feb. 28, 2016)
3. “Iran’s elections are magic” (By Eli Lake, Bloomberg views, Feb. 29, 2016)
4. “No new dawn in Iran” (By Ruthie Blum, Israel Hayom, March 1, 2016)
5. “The victims of wishful thinking about Iran” (By Saeid Golkar, The National Interest, Feb. 21, 2016)

 

ARTICLES

WHAT IF THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT WAS IN CHARGE OF U.S. ELECTIONS?

What if the Iranian Government Was in Charge of U.S. Elections?
Political satire by Ebrahim Nabavi

www.iranhumanrights.org/2016/02/nabavi-10-guardian-council/

Elections will be held in Iran in a few days and in the U.S. in a few months. Here’s what the Guardian Council, the clerical body charged with vetting all candidates in the Islamic Republic, would do if it was in charge of the American elections:

1. Declare Bernie Sanders a heretic and roundup and arrest his followers.

2. Disqualify Hillary Clinton because of her husband’s illegitimate relations with Monica Lewinsky.

3. Disqualify Donald Trump because he’s rich and obviously corrupt. Then reinstate him as a revolutionary because of all the nonsense he says. Then demand his resignation and prosecution for financial crimes.

4. Shut down The New York Times and ban political ads from appearing on any TV channel, except Fox News, until the end of the elections.

5. Block access to Facebook, Twitter and Instagram until after the elections and send Mark Zuckerberg to prison for acting against national security.

6. Ban Barack Obama’s image from appearing in the press and prohibit the media from broadcasting anything about his family.

7. Appoint the U.S. Army, Air Force and Navy as election monitors.

8. Disqualify Jeb Bush because he’s not going to get enough votes, or ask him to step down and keep quiet until after the elections, or send him to prison for becoming a candidate.

9. Disqualify all candidates from the Democratic Party.

10. Approve the nominations of Mark Rubio and Ted Cruz. Then order the police to prevent any gatherings in support of Cruz and ban all his campaign posters. Then declare Rubio the winner with 63 percent of the vote.

 

MODERATION, TEHRAN STYLE

Moderation, Tehran Style
Iranians can vote for whoever the Ayatollahs say they can vote for
Editorial
The Wall Street Journal
Feb. 28, 2016

One of the Obama Administration’s hopes for its nuclear deal with Iran was that it would empower regime moderates. So it’s no surprise that the deal’s cheerleaders are proclaiming Friday’s election results as a triumph for the Islamic Republic’s “moderate” and “reformist” factions. That depends on the meaning of the word “moderate.”

At stake Friday were seats in the Majlis, or Parliament, and the Assembly of Experts, the body that will select Iran’s next Supreme Leader. Like all Iranian elections, the vote was a carefully stage-managed process. Iranians picked from among candidates prescreened for ideological orthodoxy by the unelected Guardian Council and various security agencies.

The Guardians disqualified 6,000, or nearly half, of the original candidates to the Majlis. Of the 801 candidates to the Assembly of Experts, only a quarter, or 161, made it to the ballot. Most of the disqualified candidates belonged to the reformist and moderate factions of the regime. Imagine U.S. midterm elections in which the White House was able to ban all Tea Party or even nonprogressive Democratic candidates from the ballot.

Western media are nonetheless describing the results as an “embarrassing defeat” for the regime’s hard-liners and the moderates’ “best nationwide electoral showing in more than a decade,” as the Associated Press put it. Of particular note are the results in the capital, Tehran, a national barometer where on Sunday it appeared that candidates on the moderate list had swept all 30 seats in the Majlis.

Some moderates. Consider Mostafa Kavakebian. The General Secretary of Iran’s Democratic Party, Mr. Kavakebian is projected to enter the Majlis as a member for Tehran. In a 2008 speech he said: “The people who currently reside in Israel aren’t humans, and this region is comprised of a group of soldiers and occupiers who openly wage war on the people.”

Another moderate is Kazem Jalali, who previously served as the spokesman for the National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee of the Majlis and is projected to have won a seat. In 2011 Mr. Jalali said his committee “demands the harshest punishment” – meaning the death penalty – for Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, the two leaders of the pro-democracy Green Movement that was bloodily suppressed after stolen elections in 2009. Those two leaders are still under house arrest.

As for new Assembly of Experts, many of the “moderates” projected to have won seats were also listed on the hard-liners’ lists, since the ratio of candidates to seats was well below two. The winners include Mohammad Reyshahry, a former Intelligence Minister believed to have helped spearhead the 1988 summary execution of thousands of leftists; Ghorbanali Dorri-Najafabadi, another former Intelligence Minister believed to have directed the “chain murders” of the late 1990s; and Ayatollah Yousef Tabatabainejad, a fierce opponent of women’s rights who has called Israel “a cancerous tumor.”

The political reality in Iran is that the Ayatollahs, backed by the Revolutionary Guards, remain firmly in control.

Discover something new.

 

IRAN’S ELECTIONS ARE MAGIC

Iran’s Elections Are Magic
By Eli Lake
Bloomberg views
February 29, 2016

If you are following the Iranian elections, prepare to be dazzled. According to major news outlets from the BBC to the Associated Press, the reformists beat the hardliners.

But wait. Didn’t Iran’s Guardian Council disqualify most of the reformists back in January? Of course it did, but thanks to the magic of Iranian politics, many of yesterday’s hardliners are today’s reformist.

Take Kazem Jalali. Until this month, Jalali was one of those hardliners whom President Barack Obama had hoped to marginalize with the Iran nuclear deal. Jalali has, for example, called for sentencing to death the two leaders of the Green Movement, who are currently under house arrest. And yet, he ran on the list endorsed by the reformists in Friday’s election.

Two former intelligence ministers, accused by Iran’s democratic opposition of having dissidents murdered, Mohammad Mohammadi Reyshahri and Ghorbanali Dorri-Najafabadi, also ran on the list endorsed by Iran’s moderate president for the Assembly of Experts, the panel that is charged with selecting the next supreme leader.

The initial Iranian reform movement of the late 1990s sought to allow more social freedoms and political opposition of the unelected side of Iran’s government, such as the office of the Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council. Over time however, the changes supported by the reformists like Mohammed Khatami, who was president between 1997 and 2005, were stymied by these unelected institutions. When the next generation of reform politicians ran for office in 2009 under the banner of the green movement, the unelected part of the state arrested their supporters when they demonstrated what they saw as a stolen election. On Friday, many of the hardliners that opposed the reformists in the late 1990s and in 2009 are running under this banner.

As Saeed Ghasseminejad, an expert on Iranian politics at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, recently said: “Putting a reformist or moderate label on hardliners does not make them reformist or moderate.”

In some cases, the transformation happened so quickly that the candidates themselves were surprised. Caitlin Shayda Pendleton, an analyst with the American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project, wrote last week, two of the candidates on Rouhani’s list for the Assembly of Experts told reporters they weren’t asked to be included among the alleged reformists. These include Ayatollah Ali Movahedi Kermani, who defended the Guardian Council’s vetting process against the reformists; as well as Ayatollah Mohammad-Ali Taskhiri, who told reporters “I believe that the correct way is Principalist, and the way of others, like Reformists or moderates, is the incorrect way.”

As Pendleton wrote on Sunday, “Many (but far from all) candidates described as Reformists in both the parliamentary and Assembly of Experts elections are actually Moderates who were endorsed by Reformist leaders as a fallback after the Guardian Council disqualified most of the Reformists trying to run.”

The headlines however tell a different story. The Guardian, for example, says: “Iranian elections deal blow to hardliners as reformists make gains.” The BBC concludes: “Reformists win all 30 Tehran seats.” And on it goes.

Headline writers should be given some slack on this. After all, President Hassan Rouhani – a moderate, but no reformer – himself has celebrated the preliminary results in the elections as a major victory. After criticizing the disqualifications, he has held his tongue and tried to make the most of a bad situation, encouraging Iranians to vote nonetheless.

The same is true for many of the marginalized reformists. Khatami, who the state has decreed an unmentionable figure for Iranian media, took to the social network Telegram to urge his countrymen to vote. The logic here is that at the very least, voters could protest the most reactionary hardliners in favor of the slightly less reactionary hardliners. This is hardly a victory for democratic change in Iran. And that is what is important for Westerners trying to make sense of Iran’s elections. While Iranian politicians have to make the best of a bad hand, we don’t. Western journalists and analysts don’t need to confer legitimacy on illegitimate elections, nor should we call hardliners “reformists.” At the very least, it’s important to hold out a higher standard for the day real reformers are allowed to compete fairly for power in Iran.

And yet many of Iran’s alleged supporters in the West have gone along with the spin. Trita Parsi, an Iranian-Swedish activist whose U.S. organization played a key role in lobbying for the Iran nuclear deal, wrote on Sunday evening that critics of Friday’s election didn’t misread what he euphemistically called the “flaws in the Iranian political system.” Rather these critics “misread the strength of the Iranian society and the sophistication of the Iranian electorate, who once again have shown that they have the maturity and wisdom to change their society peacefully from within, without any support or interference from the outside.”

It’s quite something when an Iranian who claims to support the opening of Iran’s society praises the “maturity and wisdom” of an electorate offered “reformists” who support the disqualification of reformers.

But this is the magic of Iran’s elections. In the end, Iran’s supreme leader doesn’t need to defend their legitimacy. He has plenty in the West eager to do it for him.

 

NO NEW DAWN IN IRAN

No new dawn in Iran
By Ruthie Blum
Israel Hayom
March 1, 2016

For the past three years, the West has been tricking itself into seeing the Islamic Republic of Iran as a country undergoing a gradual process of reform. The outcome of Friday’s two elections – one for the Majlis (parliament) and the other for the Assembly of Experts – is serving as the latest mirage in the delusion.

In 2013, when Hassan Rouhani replaced Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president of Iran, the United States and Europe took it as a sign of a new dawn. Even Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the chief mullah controlling Iran’s “elected” leader, came to understand that Rouhani was preferable to the volatile and fanatic Ahmadinejad, whose repeated pronouncements about wiping Israel off the map before attending to America were not serving Tehran in good stead.

Rouhani’s appearance on the international stage provided particular fantasy-fodder for supporters of a diplomatic solution to the problem of Iran’s race to obtain nuclear weapons and to guarantee its regional, and eventually global, hegemony.

Those people today feel vindicated for two reasons. The first is that world powers finally did reach a nuclear deal with Iran. The second is that Rouhani’s “pro-deal” camp emerged victorious in the latest parliamentary election, and two of the most hard-line ayatollahs were voted out of the Assembly of Experts, the body charged with appointing the supreme leader. And considering Khamenei’s advancing age and questionable health, this clerical assembly, which sits for eight years, is likely to end up selecting his successor.

To understand why the above is no cause for celebration, two crucial things need to be kept in mind: the only thing the nuclear deal accomplished was to enable Iran to step up its nuclear program, but with lots more money at its disposal; and Rouhani is no moderate.

Indeed, Iran continues to assert its right to nuclear power, while flexing its military muscles nearly daily by testing missiles and threatening the West not to intervene. In addition, celebrations less than three weeks ago marking the anniversary of the 1979 revolution that turned Iran into an Islamic state included chants of “death to America,” “death to Israel” and a reenactment of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy’s humiliation of U.S. sailors who had strayed into Tehran’s territorial waters.

A review of Rouhani’s record also leaves little room for optimism. Though the Shiite cleric was not Khamenei’s preferred choice, he would never have been approved as a candidate in the first place if his revolutionary credentials had not been impeccable. And they certainly were.

Rouhani was a long-time Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini loyalist, who has always backed and spearheaded the quelling of any popular protests, employing any bloody means to nip them in the bud. The only real difference between him and his predecessor is in his strategic understanding of how to accomplish Iran’s goals by presenting himself as more palatable to the West.

In 1992, his eldest son committed suicide, leaving a note to this very effect, saying, “I hate your government, your lies, your corruption, your religion, your double-dealing and your hypocrisy. I am ashamed to live in an environment in which I am forced to lie to my friends every day and tell them that my father is not part of all this – to tell them that my father loves the nation and to know that the reality is far from this. I get nauseated when I see you, father, kissing Khamenei’s hand.”

But it was his resume that made Rouhani such an appropriate nuclear negotiator, a role he fulfilled for years. Addressing Iran’s Supreme Cultural Revolution Council in September 2005, he explained the purpose of being a wolf in sheep’s clothing: “While we were talking with the Europeans in Tehran, we were installing equipment in parts of the Isfahan facility,” he said. “By creating a calm environment, we were able to complete the work.”

It is this tactic that puts Rouhani in the “pragmatist” camp.

In July, after the completion of the nuclear deal was first announced – and then disputed as to its contents, perceived differently in Washington and Tehran – Rouhani made a speech to the Iranian public.

“Peace and blessings upon the pure souls of the prophets and the holy men, the great Prophet of Islam [Muhammad], the imams, the imam of the martyrs [Khomeini], and the exalted martyrs, especially the nuclear [scientists], and peace and blessings upon the Hidden Imam,” he began.

“We aspired to achieve four goals: The first was to continue the nuclear capabilities, the nuclear technology, and even the nuclear activity. The second was to remove the mistaken, oppressive, and inhuman sanctions. The third was to remove the Security Council resolutions that we see as illegitimate. The fourth was to remove the nuclear dossier from Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter and the Security Council in general. All four goals have been achieved today.”

He later referred to Israel’s warnings about the deal. “The people in Gaza, the West Bank, Jerusalem and Lebanon are happy, too, because the hollow efforts of the oppressive Zionist regime to thwart the negotiations during the past 23 months have failed,” he said, ending with a message to the Arab countries of the region.

“Do not be misled by the propaganda of the Zionist regime and the evil-mongers of this [Iranian] nation,” he cautioned. “Iran and its might are always your might. We see the security of the region as our security, and the stability of the region as our stability.”

Let us not kid ourselves. Rouhani’s showing in the elections does not signify a new era of freedom for the Iranian people. Nor does it indicate a shift away from the regime’s sponsorship of global terrorism. On the contrary, if anything, it could provide American voters with a false sense of national – and international – security that is utterly unwarranted.

 

THE VICTIMS OF WISHFUL THINKING ABOUT IRAN

The Victims of Wishful Thinking about Iran
By Saeid Golkar
The National Interest
February 21, 2016

The implementation of the nuclear deal, the recent release of several American prisoners held by Iran and the swift release of U.S. Navy personnel captured by the Iranian military all perpetuate the belief that Iran wishes to resume open and benevolent relations with the West and the United States. Some even hope this will lead to the gradual implementation of democracy in Iran. But this analysis is premature. Ruling hardliners continue to resist reforms even as they present a façade of reform to the rest of the world.

Consider the recent political events in Iran. In October, Iran tested mid-range ballistic missiles – in violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions – despite having just signed a treaty aimed at preventing nuclear proliferation. Then, the detention of American sailors, which seemed to be resolved amicably, was later revealed to be an antagonistic exercise after the regime broadcasted footage showing the sailors held at gunpoint and humiliated while in custody. Ayatollah Khamenei later praised the decision of the naval commander to detain the American sailors, awarding him the most prestigious military medal in Iran.

Unfortunately, the nature of the Iranian government is such that it concentrates the most power among the least democratic institutions in the country. President Rouhani, the country’s elected executive, has been the face of Iran’s foreign relations, including negotiations for the recently implemented nuclear framework. But Iranian foreign policy is, in reality, controlled by the unelected Supreme Leader. Ayatollah Khamenei will not allow meaningful reforms in foreign policy or domestic politics, despite the reform-minded wishes of President Rouhani. The president is mainly an agent for the implementation of the Supreme Leader’s policies.

While Ayatollah Khamenei has allowed some semblance of political normalization to occur, he does not actually want the kind of pervasive normalization that will empower Iranians and lead to democracy. Rather, he wants Iran to be accepted in international diplomacy when it can benefit his country’s international image and geopolitical significance – but not when it would compromise the stability of his establishment regime. In other words, the Ayatollah desires selective normalization.

Khamenei’s goal is to create an international image of Iran as a stable nation with worldly institutions, instead of an isolated, adversarial, theocratic regime. This vision includes sincere relations with China and Russia – nations that, while ideologically distinct from Iran, will not push Iran to democratize.

The benefits of Ayatollah Khamenei’s foreign policy approach have already manifested themselves through sanctions relief and the legitimization of Iran’s nuclear research program. These developments are both the result of and will further contribute to the notion that Iran is becoming a legitimate international actor. They will also bring economic benefits almost exclusively to the country’s elite.

The hardliners aren’t afraid to wield power to ensure that their authority is not substantially challenged. With upcoming parliamentary and Assembly of Experts elections on February 26, the Guardian Council has, within its constitutional authority, disqualified 99 percent of reformists who registered to run in these elections. Not only will this harm President Rouhani’s ability to influence legislation, it will also threaten his control of the executive branch.

The pragmatists’ inability to succeed legislatively will likely frustrate reform-minded citizens, who will voice their discontent with their representatives, namely President Rouhani, in the next election. This is the process that allowed Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a hardline loyalist to the Islamic Revolution and the Supreme Leader, to succeed President Khatami in 2005, and it will all but assure that the hardliner policies will remain unchanged.

Even if President Rouhani wants to challenge the hardliner grip on foreign policy, his available recourse is limited. While he does have connections within the security establishment aligned with the Supreme Leader, Rouhani could not mobilize them to negotiate a deal allowing reformists to participate in the elections. Rouhani could decide to not hold elections, but this is extremely unlikely and would have its own consequences for the public’s perception of his commitment to democracy.

As it stands, the true nature of the Iranian government, in relation to both the international community and its internal affairs, is unlikely to change anytime soon. The hardliner regime’s propensity for normalization with select members of the international community is meaningless without sincere normalization with the United States and the West, and elections will continue to be manipulated in favor of hardliners at the expense of pragmatists and reformists. Neither normalization nor democratization in Iran are likely to occur soon, and those suggesting otherwise are victims of wishful thinking.

(Saeid Golkar is a visiting fellow for Iran policy at The Chicago Council on Global Affairs and an adjunct professor for the Middle East and North African Studies Program)

All notes and summaries copyright © Tom Gross. All rights reserved.