Many in Turkey and Jordan seek to drive out millions of Syrians, who may flee to Europe

August 15, 2019

I’ve been in Iraqi Kurdistan for the past few days, and am about to go to a conference in Europe, so I am doing a limited number of dispatches at the present time. (Above: Photo of me from Sunday in the mountains near Silemani (in Kurdish; in Arabic: Sulaymaniyah), fairly close to the Iranian border.)



[Note by Tom Gross]

I attach two pieces below, the first on Turkey, the second on Jordan. They discuss the growing political tensions in those countries over the Syrian refugee issue and the demands from wide sections of both societies to drive millions of Syrian refugees out.

It is not clear if President Assad will allow Sunni Arabs back into Syria in any sizable numbers as he continues to try to cleanse the country of what was the majority Sunni population, at the behest of Shia Iran.

If the crackdowns in Turkey and Jordan gather pace, refugees in Turkey (and perhaps also in Jordan) may have little choice but to flee into Europe.

Both Turkey and Jordan argue that they have been unfairly burdened with a very large number of refugees from a conflict that could gave been thwarted, or at least severely curtailed, had President Barack Obama not overridden the advice of his own intelligence and military chiefs and of his then secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and reneged on his “red lines” in 2013.

There are now 3,614,108 registered Syrians in Turkey, officially adding 4.4% to Turkey’s population of 82 million. (In addition there are an estimated 1.5 million unregistered Syrians in Turkey.)


According to polls, 68% of Turks say they want the Syrians to leave. It is the one issue in Turkish politics uniting both supporters and opponents of President Erdogan, who are sharply divided on pretty much everything else.

A Turkish subscriber to this Mideast list, who I interviewed for this dispatch, tells me:

“The actual number of Turks who want all Syrians to leave is closer to 80 or 90 percent.

“Many Syrians are working for under the minimum wage, causing economic disruption to working-class Turks. Syrians are also alleged to have carried out a disproportionate number of crimes, including sexual crimes against children. Whether true or not this is the perception, fuelled by both regular media and social media.

“There is also historical antipathy between Turks and Arabs. Many Turks are tolerant to other newcomers, for example, to recently arrived African migrants in Turkey, just as we were welcoming to Jews fleeing the Spanish Inquisition. But when it comes to Arabs, attitudes by both Turks and Turkish Kurds are different.

“After eight years of doing our best to help the Syrians, our patience has run out, with the high level of criminality among the refugee population and the EU only providing a portion of the money it is costing us to house them.”

“Erdogan, on the other hand, wants them to stay and to give them Turkish citizenship because he is confident they are mostly Islamists and will vote for him.”



The second article below examines the situation of Syrian refugees in Jordan. More than 1.4 million Syrians in Jordan now represent 14 percent of the population. This influx has created massive socioeconomic problems for Jordan.

Camps such as the Zaatri refugee camp, home to up to 150,000 people, have witnessed riots in part as result of harsh desert and weather conditions. They have also become an incubator for diseases that had been eliminated in Jordan including tuberculosis and hepatitis.

The plight of the refugees in Turkey and Jordan is quite separate from the continuing bombardment by the forces of Assad, Russia and Iran, of large numbers of internally displaced Syrians in Idlib province in northern Syria. (See, for example, my first note in this dispatch from May.)

-- Tom Gross



Growing anti-Syrian sentiment in Turkey
By Soner Cagaptay and Deniz Yuksel
The Washington Institute for Near East policy
August 5, 2019

Refugees are being blamed for the country’s economic and social troubles, resulting in online hate speech, vigilante violence, and further pressure on the government to change the status quo in north Syria.


On June 22, the office of provincial governor Ali Yerlikaya announced that Syrian nationals who are not registered in Istanbul would have to leave the city by August 20. The area is now closed to further registration of such nationals, half a million of whom reside in Istanbul city alone. Coming from the office of an official appointed by the central government, the announcement highlights the country’s growing political tensions over the refugee issue.


According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Turkey currently hosts 3,614,108 Syrians. This figure constitutes nearly two-thirds of the entire Syrian refugee community worldwide, and a 4.4% addition to Turkey’s population of 82 million citizens as of 2018. For the most part, the government has cared for these refugees using its own resources, with some assistance from the European Union.

The Istanbul governor’s decision comes at a time of increasing public resentment toward these Syrians, whom the central government does not formally recognize as refugees, classifying them as “under temporary protection status” instead. In a poll conducted earlier this year, 68% of Turkish respondents expressed discontent with the Syrian presence, compared to 58% in 2016.

Turks are sharply divided on many issues, with one bloc tending to oppose President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s policies and an equal-size bloc ardently supporting him. Yet dissatisfaction with the decision to welcome Syrian refugees since 2011 is a rare exception to that rule, garnering majority criticism across party lines. Around 60% of those who back Erdogan’s governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) express discontent with the Syrian presence, together with 64% from the AKP-allied Nationalist Action Party (MHP); on the opposition side, the figures are 62% from the IYI Party, 71% from the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), and 83% from the Republican People’s Party (CHP).


The arrival of Syrian refugees is Turkey’s most significant demographic shift since its “population exchange” with Greece in the 1920s. According to official Turkish figures, only around 100,000 of them remain sheltered in camps; the vast majority have settled in cities and towns among the broader population. Most of them (3.2 million, or 88%) are concentrated in fourteen of Turkey’s eighty-one provinces: namely, the Syrian border provinces of Gaziantep, Hatay, Kilis, Mardin, and Sanliurfa; the nearby southern provinces of Adana, Mersin, and Kahramanmaras; and the demographically and economically larger provinces of Ankara, Bursa, Istanbul, Izmir, Kayseri, and Konya.

Istanbul has the largest number—547,479, or nearly 4% of the province’s 2018 population. Yet the demographic impact on the country’s smaller southern provinces is even more significant. Syrians equal 27% of the population in Hatay, 22% in Gaziantep, 21% in Sanliurfa, and a whopping 81% in Kilis.


Although these “protected” Syrians enjoy basic public services like healthcare and education, their temporary status does not allow them to work legally in Turkey. Ankara has long hoped that they will one day go back to Syria and has therefore shied away from taking steps that might help them become permanent residents. Syrians are encouraged to apply for residency permits to obtain legal employment, but the accompanying bureaucratic requirements and restrictions make this very difficult. So far, only around 200,000 refugees have been granted citizenship, residency, or work permits allowing them legal employment.

Consequently, many of the 2.1 million working-age refugees have resorted to informal and irregular employment, usually for scant pay far below Turkey’s minimum wage. According to a July study by the Brookings Institution, between 500,000 and one million Syrians continue to provide informal labor despite poor working conditions and rampant exploitation, mostly in the textile, services, construction, and education sectors.

Last year, the Germany-based Institute of Labor Economics found that this influx of Syrian workers did not drive down wages outside Turkey’s informal and part-time labor sectors. Nevertheless, many citizens believe that Syrians are to blame for rising unemployment and low wages across all sectors. Unemployment was at 14% as of March, up from 9% in 2011. Put another way, the number of jobless Turks has nearly doubled to 4.5 million since the government first began admitting Syrian refugees.

Meanwhile, sharp increases in consumer prices have dramatically increased the cost of living for the average citizen. Inflation held just under 20% in March after reaching a record 25% last year, and wage boosts have not compensated for the price spike. For at least some citizens whose earnings have been hit hard, the meager 120 lira ($20) per month in aid given to registered Syrian families looks increasingly like unfair treatment, especially for those who wrongly believe that this and other EU-financed programs are funded by Turkish taxpayers. According to a July report by Al-Monitor, some locals also claim that Syrians have unfair economic advantages because they can open unlicensed businesses, and because they are not subject to the tax requirements imposed on citizens.


The Syrian presence is also being blamed for many of Turkey’s social troubles. Emerging opinion leaders with large online followings have been especially important in normalizing anti-Syrian attitudes. Dismissed MHP parliamentarian Sinan Ogan, who boasts over a million Twitter followers, attracted thousands of interactions with a July post claiming that Syrian and Afghan refugees rape women and boys, and that “chopping heads” is a part of Syrian culture. Similarly, a recent article by popular opposition journalist Yilmaz Ozdil alleged that Syrians are “invading” Istanbul “street by street,” causing disturbances and forcing Turks to move out of their neighborhoods. He also accused them of setting up illegal businesses, forming gangs, and stockpiling prescription drugs, claiming that “Syrians are free to commit crimes.”

Yet official statistics cited by Euronews indicate that Syrians were involved in only 853 of 32,553 criminal incidents in Istanbul last year. In other words, the city suffered 153 incidents per 100,000 Syrians, significantly less than the 210 incidents that occurred per 100,000 Turks.

Despite these numbers, widespread incitement has produced a dangerous cycle of online hate leading to violence offline. Popular accounts often disseminate such statements with the hashtag “#SuriyelilerDefoluyor” (“Syrians get out”). And accounts owned by public figures or anonymous individuals frequently spread false stories about Syrians harassing, raping, and even murdering Turkish citizens.

Some consumers of this content have used social media to organize and carry out violence against Syrians, with attacks against individual refugees increasingly erupting into mass violence. This February, for example, an argument between residents and refugees in Istanbul transformed into large-scale clashes. And on June 29, dozens of vigilantes attacked Syrian businesses in Istanbul’s Kucukcekmece district after a Syrian man was falsely accused of molesting a young girl.


Turkey’s growing anti-Syrian sentiment appears to be one of several factors eroding public support for President Erdogan, even to the point of bringing the pro- and anti-Erdogan blocs together. Well aware of this trend, Erdogan is doing whatever he can to repatriate as many refugees as possible back to Syria. The government has already transferred hundreds of thousands of refugees to Turkish-controlled enclaves in northwest Syria. Attempting to further this model, Erdogan has been pushing Washington to create a joint “safe zone” in northeast Syria and repatriate more refugees there. He may even be willing to strike a grand bargain with the Assad regime, recognizing it as Syria’s legitimate government in return for Damascus allowing refugees to return to their homes. At the very least, he would likely demand that Turkey retain control over its enclaves in north Syria in order to facilitate the return of more refugees.



The End of the Syrian Civil War
How Jordan Can Cope
By Mohammed Bani Salameh and Ayman Hayajneh
Middle East Quarterly
Summer 2019

The Syrian civil war produced one of the largest, longest, and most complex humanitarian crises of the twenty-first century. More than twelve million people have fled to Arab and Western countries since June 2011, including over 1.4 million to Jordan, equivalent to 14 percent of the Jordanian population.

This influx has created massive socioeconomic problems for the Hashemite Kingdom, including increased poverty, unemployment, budget deficits, and pressure on health and education infrastructures. This migration has had far-reaching political and security effects, notably erosion of Jordanian national identity, curtailment of the country’s democratization process, and progressive unravelling of its social fabric due to increased violence, extremism, and corruption.

How have the Jordanian authorities addressed this formidable challenge, and is there light at the end of the tunnel now that the Syrian civil war seems to be drawing to a close?


Located in the heart of the Middle East, Jordan remains vulnerable to migration during regional conflicts and has a long experience dealing with refugees. As early as the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth, the territory that was to become Jordan received waves of immigrants from Chechnya and Circassia, fleeing the Russian occupation of the Caucasus.[1] After the destruction of the Ottoman Empire and the imposition of the French mandate on Syria, Jordan experienced the first wave of Syrian immigrants, including a large number of politicians such as Ali Reza Alrekabi, who later became Jordan’s prime minister, and members of the Syrian Independence Party, who occupied important political positions.[2]

During the Palestinian Arab violence of 1936-39, Jordan was a safe haven for many guerillas fleeing the British mandatory authorities. In 1948, following the outbreak of the first Arab-Israeli war, some 600,000 Palestinians emigrated, and Jordan received the lion’s share.[3] In 1967, Jordan was surprised by a new wave of Palestinian refugees following Israel’s occupation of the West Bank.[4]

In the late 1970s, the country hosted Lebanese refugees fleeing the civil war there, and the following decade it hosted Iraqi refugees of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88). With the expulsion of some 400,000 Palestinians from Kuwait after the emirate’s liberation from Iraq’s brutal occupation (August 1990-February 1991), Jordan witnessed a third wave of Palestinian refugees that placed considerable strain on its infrastructure, demographic composition, and national identity.[5]

With the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, Jordan became the largest host of Iraqi refugees, with the one-million-plus arrivals amounting to some 20 percent of the kingdom’s population.[6] At the start of the so-called Arab Spring, Jordan accepted thousands of Egyptian, Libyan, and Yemeni refugees.

Finally, with the eruption of the Syrian revolution in 2011, Jordan was at the forefront of countries that opened their doors to refugees fleeing the horrors of the war. The number of Syrians has now reached over 1.4 million, approximately 650,000 of whom are officially registered.[7]


During the Arab uprisings, the Jordanian political regime was able to maintain its status quo and avoided making meaningful concessions.[8] It exploited the Syrian crisis and the influx of refugees to remind local protesters and reformers of the possible adverse consequences. This curbed the Jordanian population’s appetite for deep political change. Protests diminished and then nearly ceased for a time; the process of reform and democratization retreated, and despotism and absolute rule became institutionalized under a regime of parliamentary and partisan pluralism.[9]

Zaatri camp, established in 2012 to host Syrian refugees, saw a dramatic increase in population to become the world’s second largest refugee camp behind Dadaab in eastern Kenya. At one point, it hosted some 150,000 refugees.[10] Movement out of the camp is loosely restricted, and many refugees have fled, though it is unknown to where and for what purpose. Even without intentions to do harm, these escapees pose a threat to Jordanian society.[11] The camp has seen increasing crime, including prostitution and drug dealing, and numerous riots have erupted as a result of harsh desert and weather conditions. The camp has also become an incubator for diseases that had been eliminated in Jordan including tuberculosis and hepatitis.[12]

With the influx of Syrian refugees, freedoms have been curtailed and the security services have expanded their control over public life to ensure quiet and stability.[13] Thus, for example, the regime adopted a policy of restricting political parties and civil society organizations, similar to that practiced vis-à-vis the unified Jordanian Front Party and the Islamic Action Front Party, the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, over the past few years. This could have serious long-term implications for Jordanian politics and civil society.

The refugee crisis also increased demonstrations and protests, with Jordan undergoing some ten changes and reshuffling of governments. In 2018 alone, the country witnessed unprecedented changes in government leadership and policy in response to widespread public demonstrations against proposed economic reforms and increasingly vociferous demands for more transparency and better government services. Public administration declined, government effecttiveness weakened, and corruption increased. International bodies such as the World Bank, the World Economic Forum, Freedom House, and others have confirmed the decline in political stability in Jordan during the Syrian civil war.[14]


The Syrian crisis also led to declines in security. Syrian missiles and artillery shells landed several times in Jordanian cities and towns while Jordanian border posts were attacked by terrorist organizations resulting in Jordanian deaths and injuries. Increased smuggling and infiltration of weapons and contraband intensified the burden on the security services.[15] This in turn raised the state of alert regarding dormant terror cells as well as increased tension within Jordanian society.

To address the security issues, militarization of Jordan has increased as the ruling elites concluded that maintaining security and stability could only be achieved by the military and that other social institutions could be dispensed with. The ineffectiveness and corruption of the civil state apparatus has been highlighted, including in the education and health sectors. These sectors were subject to a campaign of doubt, leaving only the military as an institution with a good reputation. The results include an increase in military spending: Jordan now ranks fourth in the Arab world and eighth at the international level in military spending relative to national income,[16] with military expenditure accounting for 20 percent of government spending.


Jordan relies heavily on foreign aid, especially from the United States, the European Union, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. This has been a constraint on its foreign policy, which has often adapted to those of donor states.[17]

As a result of the Syrian refugee crisis, Jordan has become even more dependent on the foreign aid necessary for economic development and for coping with the burdens of the Syrian refugee crisis. Pressure by the Gulf states for Jordan to intervene in the Syrian civil war and to take an anti-regime position has been particularly strong.[18] This has placed Amman in a tight situation. On the one hand, it does not want to anger the Gulf states, but on the other, it has its own concerns about the Syrian rebellion, the opposition, and the transformations in the Arab world. Cautiously treading the tight rope in its increasingly volatile neighborhood, Amman had to accommodate a complex set of interconnected, and often contradictory, interests of allies and regional influences. Finding the right balance between those calling for the overthrow of the Assad regime and those supporting it—internally, regionally, and internationally—has proved a particularly demanding task.

Jordan’s external relations have also been stalemated with such pivotal countries as Turkey and Iran. Syria is Jordan’s only land crossing to Turkey and Europe. Even worse was the closure of the Iraqi border for several years, nearly isolating Jordan for a time. The country’s dependence is also illustrated in its policies toward Islamists. The Gulf states have placed the Muslim Brotherhood on their lists of terrorist groups, increasing the pressure on Jordan to do likewise. As a result, the Hashemite regime has been unable to maintain its traditional relationship with the Brotherhood, which it regards as being under control, while balancing its interests with the Gulf states, especially the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Amman thus sought to Jordanize the local Brotherhood by demanding that it be separated from the Cairo-based Global Guidance Bureau, the Brotherhood’s highest decision-making body. The regime also called for a separation from Hamas, with the group’s Jordanian headquarters closed on the pretext of being unlicensed and its political and social activities placed under siege.[19]


National identity is one of the most sensitive and complex issues in Jordan. Since its creation in 1921 until recently, Jordan adopted a pan-Arab orientation at both state and society levels,[20] but the Syrian crisis saw a surge of distinct Jordanian nationalist sentiments. Jordanians expressed dissatisfaction with the Syrian migration wave, which adversely affected their lives on many levels and which underscored the weakness of national, religious and social links between them and their Syrian “brothers.” The crisis thus heralded the end of Jordan’s pan-Arab orientation. Having hosted revolutionaries from Syria and Palestine in the 1920s and 1930s, the kingdom retreated to its narrow tribal and local affiliations. Despair has spread among Jordanians as they stopped believing in the idea of “Arab nationalism.”[21]

The rapid influx of Syrian refugees has also increased Jordanians’ fear of becoming a minority in their own country. From 1948 to date, including the recent Syrian arrivals, the number of immigrants has exceeded that of indigenous people. According to U.S. ambassador to Amman Alice Wells, as a result of successive waves of immigration, the indigenous proportion of the total population is as low as 27 percent. This caused a stir in Jordanian society, but at the same time raised the question of national identity to new heights. Jordanians are becoming paranoid because they feel outnumbered. Furthermore, since tribal identity is an essential driver of Jordanian society, Jordanians are less receptive to outsiders and subcultural identities.[22]

A number of Syrian refugees in Jordan have no desire to return home. Settling these refugees in Jordan will intensify as a result of international pressures, but such settlement will exacerbate the crisis of Jordanian national identity, which has maintained its Transjordanian distinctiveness despite the regime’s efforts to develop a hybrid identity encompassing both the indigenous tribes and the Palestinian population that has settled in the kingdom after the 1948 and 1967 wars. Preserving Jordanian national identity will require reconsidering the policy of open borders. But the inability of the state to control its borders marginalizes the role of civil society in the face of successive refugee waves.[23]


Jordan experienced extremism and terrorism before the Syrian revolution, notably the Amman hotel bombings in 2005. The Jordanian state sought to combat the threat by targeting youth at risk for multiple reasons such as poverty, unemployment, the failure of development projects, the absence of social justice, and the spread of corruption.[24]

During the Syrian revolution, terrorist organizations managed to spread extremist ideology. The Islamic State (ISIS), through its media apparatus, mobilized hundreds of Jordanians to its ranks. The number of Jordanians in a variety of extremist groups in both Iraq and Syria is estimated at three thousand,[25] and the security forces are pursuing dozens of people accused of joining or sympathizing with such organizations.

It was long believed that the majority of these recruits were uneducated, marginalized, and poor, mainly from hardline and non-Jordanian families. But the intensification of the Syrian civil war has radicalized young people from different backgrounds—from the middle class or the bourgeoisie; from groups that historically have been bastions of regime support, and from different regions of the country. Through the spread of jihadism in mosques, schools, and universities, extremist groups have become attractive to different groups and classes of society. Some have embraced jihadist ideology and have been trained and used in combat in Syria and Iraq.[26]


Corruption is one of the foremost challenges facing Jordan, with a highly negative impact on reform policies, development, and stability. Combating corruption is a top priority for King Abdullah II, but the regime has had little success to date.[27]

The Syrian crisis has led to an unprecedented spike in the scope of corruption, penetrating all aspects of political, economic, and administrative life.[28] Perhaps one of the most prominent effects is the weakened prestige of the state as a result of individual corruption, especially by civil servants and among those in high official circles, what is known as “grand corruption.”[29]

Corruption has also been made more prevalent by the blatant state’s favoritism of a small and cohesive ruling elite and its failure to carry out the necessary socioeconomic reforms to widen the national distribution of resources.[30] The government’s ability to provide the basic requirements of life for citizens, such as food, water, housing, health care, education, and legal services, has declined, while poverty, unemployment, marginalization, injustice, corruption, lack of oversight and accountability, have become widespread. Access to public services has become the main concern for citizens, but the ruling elite believes that relative privation prevents citizens from raising the level of demands. This sterile thinking has made the situation a ticking time bomb, with spreading poverty, unemployment, economic crises, low wages, and high prices creating an environment conducive to corruption.

Corruption in Jordan is practiced in broad daylight, and efforts to combat it have evaporated.

Finally, with the decline of the democratization process, the political will to combat corruption has weakened, and the ability of government officials to act with little accountability has increased.

Corruption is practiced by the influential in broad daylight, and efforts to combat it have evaporated. This is confirmed by the reports on world corruption indicators.[31]


Whatever the economic and social costs of the Syrian refugee crisis, they are secondary to its adverse political effects on the Jordanian state and society: The kingdom’s hesitant drive toward reform and democracy has been curtailed and its national identity has been eroded. Fighting violence and extremism has become an all-consuming preoccupation with corruption skyrocketing to unprecedented heights. These are exorbitant and far-reaching consequences, which will reverberate throughout Jordan way beyond the end of the Syrian civil war and which cannot be reckoned with quickly or impulsively.

No less importantly, the refugee crisis has exposed the fundamental flaws and distortions of Jordanian society and the political system, notably the fragility of the democratic experiment, weakness of national identity, and lack of trust in the state and its institutions due to their longstanding marginalization of large segments of society and their exclusion from the national decision-making process.[32]

Nor does Jordan, for all its historical experience with refugees and asylum seekers, have an effective national strategy to deal with the Syrian refugee problem. Most of the policies have been reactive, leading to decreasing public confidence in the state and prompting widespread demand for ending the country’s open door policy.

What is needed, therefore, is a new comprehensive approach that:

1. Brings Jordanian politicians, intellectuals, academics and decision-makers to the discussion regarding a refugee policy.

2. Encourages the media to address the problem in an open manner and with no fear of retribution.

3. Demands that the international community recognize Jordan’s critical role in alleviating the Syrian refugee problem (with the attendant financial and material assistance), while stressing the need for a postwar repatriation of the refugees.

4. Reconsiders the national strategy to combat extremism, terrorism and corruption, including the incorporation of clerics into this effort.

5. Promotes greater democratization and political reform in Jordan by advancing participation, transparency, and accountability, and by combating corruption and renouncing violence and extremism.

This may well be a tall order for the Jordanian polity. But failure to make a sharp break from past practices is an assured recipe for disaster.

(Mohammed Bani Salameh and Ayman Hayajneh are members of the political science department at Yarmouk University, Irbid, Jordan.)



[1] For more information, see Jordanian Chechen Site.

[2] Philip S. Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920-1945 (London: I.B.Tauris, 1987), pp. 220-7.

[3] Efraim Karsh, “How Many Palestinian Arab Refugees Were There?” Israel Affairs, Apr. 2011, pp. 224-46.

[4] Adnan Abu-Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1999), pp. 133-6.

[5] Mohammed Bani Salameh and Khalid Edwan, “The identity crisis in Jordan: Historical pathways and contemporary debates,” Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, Oct. 2016 .

[6] Ahmed al-Shiyab, “The Legal, Economic and Social Conditions of Iraqi Residents,” Refugees, Displaced and Forced Migration Research Center, Yarmouk University, Irbid, Jor., 2009, p. 8.

[7] “Syria: Regional Refugee Response—Jordan,” UNHCR (U.N. Refugee Agency), 2017.

[8] Mohammed Bani Salameh, “Political Reform in Jordan: Reality and Aspirations,” World Affairs Journal, May 2018.

[9] Mohammed Bani Salameh and Azzam Elananzah, “Constitutional reforms in Jordan: A critical analysis,” Digest of Middle East Studies, Fall 2015.

[10] BBC News (London), Apr. 6, 2014.

[11] Andrew E. Szparga, “The Effects of the Syrian Refugee Crisis on Jordan’s Internal Security,” Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection, SIT Study Abroad, Fall 2014.

[12] Asharq al-Awsat (London), May 19, 2013.

[13] Hasan Barari, “Reform and the Dynamics of Instability in Jordan during the Arab uprisings,” Perceptions, Center for Strategic Research of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, Winter 2015, p. 73.

[14] “Jordan: Political Stability,” The Global, 2019.

[15] Al-Jazeera TV (Doha), June 21, 2016.

[16] “Jordan: Military Expenditures,” Index Mundi, Charlotte, N.C.

[17] Laurie Brand, Jordan’s Inter-Arab Relations: The Political Economy of Alliance Making (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), p. 38.

[18] Mahmoud Khalid Waleed, “Where does Jordan stand on the Syrian crisis?” Middle East Monitor, Jan. 24, 2014.

[19] Jacob Amis, “The Jordanian Brotherhood in the Arab Spring,” The Hudson Institute, Washington, D.C., Dec. 27, 2012.

[20] Betty S. Anderson, Nationalist Voices in Jordan: The Street and the State (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005), pp. 70-7.

[21] Curtis R. Ryan, “Jordanian Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring,” Middle East Policy Council, Spring 2014.

[22] W. Haynes, “Jordanian society’s responses to Syrian refugees,” Military Review, Jan.-Feb. 2016.

[23] Salameh and Edwan, “The identity crisis in Jordan.”

[24] The Jordan Times (Amman), May 17, 2016.

[25] “From Jordan to Jihad: The Lure of Syria’s Violent Extremist Groups,” Policy Brief, Mercy Corps, Portland, Ore.

[26] Mohammed Abu Roman, “Riwayat Daesh al-Jurduniya,”

[27] “Jordan,” Corruption Perception Index, Transparency International, Berlin.

[28] The Jordan Times, Jan. 26, 2017.

[29] Robert Satloff and David Schenker, “Political Instability in Jordan,” Contingency Planning Memorandum, no.19, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, May 2013.

[30] Curtis R. Ryan, “Political Opposition and Reform Coalitions in Jordan,” British Journal of Middle East Studies, 2011, no. 3.

[31] The Jordan Times, Jan. 26, 2017.

[32] Mohammed T. Bani Salameh and Sadam Darawsheh, “Human Rights in the Jordanian Constitution: Between Theoretical Texts and Practical Application,” International Journal of Human Rights and Constitutional Studies, May 2018.


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